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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, 
Respondent/ Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AS APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial courts review challenged informal administrative proceedings by trial de 
novo. Such trials de novo correct any procedural due process errors that might have 
occurred. In this action, the trial judge failed to conduct a trial de novo. Instead he 
reviewed the informal record and remanded this matter for the Division to correct a 
notice that was deemed inadequate and to consider further evidence. The trial judge did 
not have the authority to review the informal adjudicative proceeding other than by trial 
de nova. 
Bryner has failed to provide any legal argument to support his claim that the trial 
~ judge was correct to review the informal record and rule upon whether the Division erred 
1 
instead of holding a trial de novo. The errors that Bryner claims were committed by the 
Division in its informal proceeding, such as inadequate notice, are the same errors that 
this Court has previously held are to be corrected through a trial de novo, not by a review 
of the agency proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY NOT HOLDING A TRIAL DE 
NOVO AS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW 
Bryner had his driver's license suspended by an informal administrative 
proceeding. Bryner filed his petition for judicial review with the trial court. J_udicial 
review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is done by trial de novo. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-4-402(l)(a) (West Supp. 2015) ("The district courts have jurisdiction to review by 
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings"). 
The trial judge erred by not conducting a trial de novo. 
Bryner argues, without citation to authority, that no trial de novo was needed 
because the trial judge was able to summarily determine that the notice given in the 
informal proceeding was defective and that erroneous facts were relied upon as well. 
Opening Brief of Petitioner at 18.1 This is contrary to this Court's previous decisions. 
An alleged defect in the notice does not excuse the court from following the 
statutory required review process. Indeed, the absolute right to a trial de novo before the 
1 The only copy of this brief received by the Division was a pdf without numbered pages. 
To make Bryner's tables of contents and authorities match the brief, the Division has 
begun its numbering of the brief with the cover as page one. 
2 
trial court is meant to correct any such errors. Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 190 P .2d 
587, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (allegedly defective notice in the informal proceeding was 
cured by trial de novo in the district court). In Brinkerhoff, the notice of the hearing 
received by the petitioner did not state that the administrative proceeding would be 
informal. The trial court reversed the agency's decision on the basis of the defective 
notice and remanded the matter to the agency. Reversing the trial court, this Court held 
that the absolute right to a trial de novo meant that the petitioner could not suffer any 
prejudice. 
Claims of factual problems in the administrative proceedings are also cured by a 
trial de· novo, not by a remand to the agency for a new hearing. In Cordova v. Blackstock, 
861 P.2d 449 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court held that a claim that the residuum rule 
had been violated was to be reviewed by trial de novo and not by reviewing the informal 
proceeding's record. 
This provision requires that the district court's review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings be accomplished by holding a new trial, not just 
by reviewing an informal record. UAPA's statutory scheme ensures that 
"each applicant has the opportunity to have a formal hearing before the 
agency, or a [trial] de novo review by the district court." One reason for 
this statutory scheme is that appellate courts need a complete record in 
order to review adjudication. 
Id. at 451 ( citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly approved of this Court's decisions in 
Cordova and Brinkerhoff. 
3 
[W]e note with approval and adopt the rule previously used in two 
decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals es~ablishing the right to a new 
trial without deference to the determinations of an informal administrative 
proceeding. This rule guarantees the district court the opportunity to 
correct any deficiencies that may arise because of the informal nature of 
administrative proceedings and provides an adequate record for future 
review. 
Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 901 P.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Utah 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
This Court's recent decision in Christensen v. Rolfe, 2014 UT App 223, 336 P.3d 
40 (informal driver's license proceedings are only reviewed by trial de novo and not by 
review of the administrative proceeding), was also presented to the trial court. R. 460, 
541,681, 706. In Christensen, this Court again affirmed that informal administrative 
proceedings are reviewed only by trial de novo and not by a review of the record of the 
informal proceeding. 2014 UT App 223, ~ 1. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge should have reviewed the challenged informal administrative 
proceeding by trial de novo. Instead, he reviewed the informal proceeding's record and 
remanded for the Division to correct errors perceived by the trial judge. The trial court's 
decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court for trial de 
novo. 
4 
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UTAH DEPARTivffiNT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, 
Respondent/ Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AS CROSS-APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2015). 
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Though warned several times by this Court, Roger Bryner has again used 
offensive, inappropriate, and disrespectful material in his opening brief. Should Bryner' s 
~ opening brief be stricken and this Court refuse to reach the merits of his cross-appeal? 
Issue Preserved Below and Standard of Review: This issue is unique to the appeal 
and does not require the review of the trial court's decision. 
5 
2. Instead of conducting a trial de novo, the trial judge ruled upon his review of 
the informal proceeding's record and remanded this action to the Division to conduct a 
new informal hearing. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review a trial court order 
remanding an action to the agency? 
Issue Preserved Below and Standard of Review: This issue is unique to the appeal 
and does not require the review of the trial court's decision. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
There is no determinative statute relevant to Bryner' s cross-appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Roger Bryner filed this petition for judicial review of an informal administrative 
proceeding in which his driver•s license was suspended. R. 227-35. 
Instead of holding a trial de novo, the trial judge reviewed the informal 
administrative proceeding. The judge held that he had insufficient information as to what 
evidence was presented in the informal proceeding. R. 586-87. The trial judge therefore 
remanded this action for the Division to consider further evidence in a new informal 
proceeding. R. 5 87. The trial judge also remanded this action to the Division to give 
Bryner new notice in lieu of the administrative notice the trial judge held to be 
inadequate. R. 586-87. 
The Court rejects the Division's position that the Court should either 
substitute its own judgment for the Division's exercise of discretion or defer 
to the Division's decision when it is unclear the Division exercised its 
6 
discretion with the actual facts before it. The statute plainly grants the 
Division discretion, but the parties' factual submissions do not indicate that 
the Division even knew of a warrant, as opposed to a citation, being issued 
against Petitioner. In such case, the alternative remedy of remand is 
appropriate. 
After reviewing the briefs and arguments and evidence submitted in 
this proceeding, the Court finds the evidence is insufficient to determine 
whether the Division was notified by a Court of and considered the 
existence of an outstanding warrant against the Petitioner, as required under 
Utah Code§ 53-3-221(3)(a). The submissions of the parties here indicate 
that Petitioner was informed of an outstanding citation, as opposed to the 
existence of a warrant. Properly framing the issue by notice is important 
for two reasons: First, it informs the Petitioner of the actual basis for the 
proposed administrative action, and second, it ensures that the Division 
made its decision based on the actual facts that potentially justify its action. 
R. 586-87. 
The trial court entered its final order on June 18, 2015. R. 5 85-87. The Division 
timely filed its notice of appeal on June 29, 2015. R. 590-92. Bryner filed a post-
judgment motion on June 30, 2015, R. 595-99, that was denied by the trial court on 
August 13, 2015. R. 640-41. Bryner filed his cross notice of appeal on September 4, 
2015 . R. 643. The Division filed its amended notice of appeal on September 9, 2015. R. 
651-52. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following quotes from Bryner's opening brief are the only facts relevant to the 
issues raised in the Division' s response brief. 
Additionally I believe the Court of Appeals in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & 
Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 Utah App. 158 (hereinafter Mike's Case) 
was incorrect in it' s ruling, ignoring supreme court legal precedent, and 
simply ruled the way it did because Mormons from the state government of 
7 
Utah were requesting the relief, much as Mormons from the state 
government of Utah are requesting relief now, and different standards are 
applied by the Mormon judges of the Court of appeals to grant relief to 
those they favor over those they do not favor. Because I do not believe that 
a honest opinion will be forthcoming, I am including arguments that discuss 
the merits of the decision and constitutional issues. 
Statement of issues on appeal 
1) The ruling in Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 
2015 Utah App. 15 8 is wrong and contrary to the weight of prior 
controlling legal precedent from the Utah Supreme Court, and a part of a 
clear pattern of the Court of Appeals ignoring that law to grant relief to 
favored appellants by way of unequal application of the law. 
Bryner' s opening brief at 5 
I agree that the court of appeals simply got it wrong in Mike's case, 
and reviewed a nonfinal order to push a decidedly mormon agenda through 
the courts, and entirely inconsistent with the prior case law on the mater 
[sic]. 
Id. at 12. 
Nobody but Roger Bryner will have ever had his license suspended 
by the Court of Appeals in the State of Utah in a memorandum decision. If 
that does not demonstrate bias, and a written and specific intent by the same 
body to discriminate against the specific in_dividual for over a decade, what 
does? See 2006 UT App 398 "special leniency on the basis of prose status 
is manifestly inappropriate." This is in fact a thinly veiled but explicit 
message from the Court of appeals to discard the protections of the 14th 
amendment of the US constitution for the disfavored party. There is nothing 
especially bad or wrong about my filings, in fact everything I submit is in 
general exceptional even for attorneys and I have a higher success ratio 
than most attorneys, and only the political opinions and agenda of the all 
mormon court of appeals is really at issue. No decision against the 
Mormons in state government will be forthcoming as long as a disfavored 
litigant who has been marked, by official opinion, for higher levels of 
scrutiny than those applied to Mormon attorneys. 
Id. at 19. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Though previously warned by this Court, Bryner has once again inserted material 
in his brief that is patently offensive and disrespectful to this Court. Bryner has been 
warned about this behavior, and has been sanctioned for it. This Court should strike 
Bryner's opening brief and decline to reach the merits of his cross-appeal. 
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from the district court's review of 
i!lfonnal administrative proceedings. This Court has already held that the district court 
court's order is an appealable final decision even when it remanded the action back to the 
v;j agency. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BRYNER'S OPENING BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN 
BECAUSE IT CONTAINS STATEMENTS THAT ARE OFFENSIVE 
AND DISRESPECTFUL TO THIS COURT 
A pleading that contains material that is "offensive, inappropriate, and 
vd disrespectful" constitutes a violation of rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Assoc., 2007 UT 2, 112, 151 P.3d 
962 (striking briefs on appeal due to inappropriate content). This Court has previously 
.placed Bryner on notice that it would not tolerate his further use of offensive and 
disrespectful statements about the courts of Utah. This notice was given as early as 2006 
in Bryner v. Lindberg, 2006 UT App U398. 
We place Petitioner on notice that he will not be afforded leniency based 
upon his prose status in the application of the procedural rules. 
Specifically, pleadings containing inappropriate content ... or pleadings 
9 
that appear calculated to harass any party, their counsel, or the court, will 
be stricken and will result in imposition of other sanctions, as allowed 
under rules 40 and 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Id. at *3 (attached as Addendum A) . 
. This Court further warned Bryner in its Order entered April 10, 2008 in 
Bryner v. Lindberg; Case No. 20080065-CA. 2 
Bryner is hereby placed on notice that any future filings that are frivolous 
or contain ( 1) statements constituting personal attacks on the integrity of the Utah 
courts or judges; (2) burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous material; or 
(3) statements intended to harass the court, any party, or counsel participating in 
the case are prohibited, shall be stricken, and/or shall result in the imposition of 
sanctions under rules 3 3 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A 
violation of this order shall be contempt, and shall be punished as this court deems 
appropriate. See Utah R. App. P. 40(c) ("This rule shall not be construed to limit 
or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers."). 
Id. at 3 (attached as Addendum B) 
This Court also ordered that: 
Bryner's future filings in this court shall not be frivolous and shall 
not include statements that (I) constitute personal attacks on the integrity of 
Utah courts or judges, ... ; (2) are "burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous", ... ; or (3) are intended to harass the court, any party, or any 
counsel participating in the case. The filing of any documents, motions, or 
pleadings of any kind containing such objectionable content shall be 
actionable as contempt, shall be- stricken, and shall be sanctioned as this 
court deems appropriate. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Shortly after this Court entered this Order, it was forced to use it against Bryner. 
In Bryner v. Bryner, Case No. 20070811, 2008 WL 2544897 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) 
2 An undated copy of this Order was obtained by counsel for the Division from this 
Court's Clerks' Office. 
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(attached as Addendum C), this Court struck Bryner's brief and declined to reach the 
merits of his appeal because of his violations of the April 10, 2008 Order and rule 24(k) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
More recently, this Court reminded Bryner that "the issuance of an arrest warrant 
was the result ofBryner's own conduct in another case and was not, as he now claims, a 
part of an alleged conspiracy involving court personnel.to deny his access to the court." 
Bryner v. Custodian of Records, 2016 UT App 40, 18 (attached as Addendum D). 
Bryner's opening brief violates this Court's prior orders and rule 24. Bryner 
VP repeatedly accuses this Court of ruling not on the merits of appeals, but in favor of certain 
parties due to their religion. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 5, 12, 19 (this material is 
quoted at length in the Statement of Relevant Facts). Bryner also accuses this Court of 
discriminating personally against-him for over a decade. Id. at 19. 
The Division· urges this Court to review the cited statements made by Bryner in his 
brief and determine if they violate this Court's prior warnings and orders. If this Court 
finds that they do, Bryner' s brief should be stricken and this Court should decline to 
reach the merits of his cross-appeal. 
II. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINAL ORDER EVEN THOUGH IT REMANDED THIS 
MATTER TO THE DIVISION 
Bryner' s argument that this Court is without jurisdiction is based on his claim that 
Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 UT App 158,353 P.3d 626, was 
wrongly decided. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 5, 8-14. Bryner's argument is that the 
11 
trial judge did not enter a final order because he remanded this matter to the Division to 
hold a new hearing rather than conduct de novo review. But this Court, following the 
Utah Supreme Court's precedent, has already held that an order remanding a petition for 
judicial review back to the administrative agency is a final order because it ended the 
controversy between the parties in the district court. Mike's Smoke, 2015 UT App 158, 
1110-11. 
This Court reached this decision following the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Zions Management Services v. Record, 2013 UT 36,305 P.3d 1062. Zions involved an 
appeal from a trial court's order remanding the action back to the administrative body to 
conduct arbitration. The Supreme Court held that remand was a final appealable order 
because it left nothing more to be done in the trial court. Id., 126. 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The trial court remanded this 
action to the Division to hold a new hearing. R. 587. Nor does the language in the trial 
court's ruling on Bryner's post-judgment motion, "[t]hat Order contemplates no further 
action by this Court until the agency completes this action" (R. 640), change the result. It 
is similar to the statement by the trial court in Mike's Smoke3 that this Court held did not 
alter the appealed from order into a non-final order. 2015 UT App 158, 112. 
While Bryner argues that Mike's Smoke was wrongly decided, he fails to argue 
why this Court should ignore stare decisis and consider reversing its prior decision. This 
Court is bound to follow the holding of Mike's Smoke because horizontal stare decisis 
3 
"until after the City [Council] holds an evidentiary hearing." 
12 
requires that an earlier decision by the same court govern later decisions. State v. Becker, 
2015 UT App 304,110,365 P.3d 173. "Although we have authority to overrule our own 
precedent in some limited circumstances, we will ' not do so lightly' - the challenged 
decision must be (1) 'clearly e1Toneous' or (2) 'conditions [must] have changed so as to 
render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 21 1, 1 44, 33 5 
P.3d 378. The decision in Mike's Smoke is not clearly erroneous. Nor have conditions 
changed since last year when the decision was made. 
This Coui1 has jurisdiction to consider the Division's appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Bryner' s opening brief should be stricken as a sanction for his use of patently 
offensive and disrespectful statements concerning this Cami. Further, this Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the Division's appeal from the trial court's order. 
>ti Respectfully submitted this ;' day of May, 2016. 
~PL~ 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Attorney for Respondent/ Appellant 
Cross-Appellee 
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va ADDENDUM "A" 
Bryner v. Lindberg, Not Reported in P.3d (2006) 
2006 UT App 398 
2006 WL 2779855 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Roger BRYNER, Petitioner, 
v. 
Honorable Judge Denise P. LINDBERG and Lana 
Bryner, Respondents. 
Nos. 20060754-CA, 20060814-CA. 
I 
Sept. 28, 2006. 
I 
Certiorari Denied Feb. 12, 2007. 
Original Proceeding in this Court. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Roger Bryner, Midvale, Petitioner Pro Se. 
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg. 
Before Judges DAVIS, McHUGH, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PERCURIAM: 
* 1 Petitioner Roger Bryner filed two petitions seeking 
extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus. 
The petition in case no. 20060754-CA essentially 
challenges restrictions imposed by the district court in 
managing the cases between Roger Bryner and Lana 
Bryner. Petitioner challenges a restriction placed on both 
parties requiring that only a single motion from each party 
can be pending at any time. He also challenges 
restrictions on using standby counsel. While that petition 
was pending, Petitioner filed a second petition, case no. 
20060814-CA, also seeking extraordinary relief against 
Judge Lindberg. In the interest of judicial economy, we 
address both petitions. 
In an order dated April 20, 2006, the district court ruled: 
The Court enjoins each side from 
filing more than one motion at a 
time. No additional motions may be 
filed by that side until the other 
side has had an opportunity to 
answer. The movant may then reply 
to the opposition, and file a notice 
to submit. The matter will then be 
submitted for decision. Once the 
Court has had the opportunity to 
rule on the pending motion, that 
party will then be free to file other 
motions. By imposing this 
limitation the Court does not intend 
to interfere with the parties' 
constitutional rights. Rather, the 
Court is exercising its inherent 
authority to manage its caseload in 
the most effective and efficient 
way, in order to ensure that all 
matters that the parties wish to 
bring for action by the Court can be 
attended to in a thorough and 
orderly manner. 
In a June 20, 2006 minute entry, the district court 
reiterated that "the filing restrictions were designed to 
strike a balance between the parties' constitutional right to 
seek redress from the courts and the Court's need to 
manage its caseload appropriately." 
In an August 10, 2006 order, the court stated its position 
that, in appearances before the court, Petitioner "must 
elect whether to appear pro se or be represented by 
counsel." Although noting that Petitioner could "freely 
consult with anyone of his choosing outside the 
courtroom," the court stated that if he wished to receive 
assistance of counsel in the court, "counsel must enter his 
appearance and then counsel (not the petitioner) will be 
the only one who will be allowed to file Motions, to make 
argument to the Court, or to conduct any presentation or 
cross-examination of proffered evidence." 
In the petition filed as case no. 20060754-CA, Petitioner 
requests an order (1) requiring Judge Lindberg to allow an 
attorney to sit silently by him and pass notes, (2) 
declaring the filing restrictions unconstitutional, and (3) 
remanding all issues regarding child custody to the 
commissioner, rather than to the district court judge. The 
claim that the district court cannot determine child 
custody issues is without merit, and we do not consider it 
· WE"STl.A\N @ 201 c, Thomson Reute(s. Ne cla,rn to original U.S. Government Works. 
Bryner v. Lindberg, Not Reported in P.3d (2006) 
2006 UT App 398 
further. 
"Extraordinary relief may be granted if ... the petitioner 
can establish that a lower court 'exceeded its jurisdiction 
or abused its discretion.' " Burke v. Lewis, 2005 UT 44,~ 
9, 122 P.3d 533 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (d)(2)(A)); 
see also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (holding that abuse of discretion for 
purposes of extraordinary writs must be more blatant 
"than the garden variety 'abuse of discretion' featured in 
routine appellate review"). "Where the challenged 
proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall 
not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(d)(4). 
*2 The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
adopting the filing restrictions. The court imposed 
reasonable restrictfons on both parties by precluding the 
filing of multiple motions until a previous motion filed by 
the same party was resolved. Petitioner's contention that 
the court did not apply the restriction to both parties is 
frivolous. The opposing parties' request for hearing on a 
pending motion does not constitute the filing of a multiple 
motion in violation of the filing restriction. Under the 
circumstances, the district court's restrictions are 
reasonable and do not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Petitioner's claim that he has been denied the 
constitutional right to counsel of his choice is unsupported 
and without merit. The case law he cites concerns the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to criminal 
defendants. Both proceedings in which Petitioner is 
involved are civil proceedings, and the cited authorities 
are not pertinent. Nevertheless, the discussion in United 
States v. Gonzales-Lopez, --- U.S. ----, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 
165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), cited by Petitioner, is illustrative 
of the discretion that a court possesses governing 
representation by counsel, even in a criminal case. The 
majority opinion acknowledged the "trial court's wide 
latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against 
the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its 
calendar." The supreme court also acknowledged the trial 
court's "inherent power to enforce rules or adhere to 
practices that determine which attorneys may appear 
before it, or to make scheduling and other decisions that 
effectively exclude a defendant's first choice of counsel." 
Id. at 2565-66. 
The district court did not restrict Petitioner from either 
representation the courtroom. district court constitutional 
proceedings is by counsel or consultation with counsel 
outside Under the circumstances, the claim that the 
abused its discretion or violated a purported right to have 
standby counsel in the civil without merit. 
The petition seeking extraordinary relief in case no. 
20060814-CA duplicates some claims from the petition in 
case no. 20060754-CA. The second petition also seeks 
relief from the district court's order denying 
cross-motions to enforce the settlement agreement, which 
is the subject of the appeal pending as case no. 
20060214-CA. In addition, the petition contains patently 
offensive and disrespectful statements regarding the 
district court judge. 
Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides an equivalent to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and requires a party to sign all filings as a 
certification that they are not frivolous or interposed for 
purposes of delay. Bryner states in the second petition: 
I further certify that to the best of 
my knowledge, information and 
belief the statements contained 
therein are true, however, I am not 
a lawyer and no reasonable 
unbiased judge could presume to 
hold me to the same standard of 
knowledge of law that an attorney 
would be held to. 
*3 On the contrary, rule 40(b) states, in part: 
The court may, after reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to show 
cause to the contrary, and upon 
hearing, if requested, take 
appropriate action against any 
attorney or person who practices 
before it for inadequate 
representation of a client, conduct 
unbecoming a member of the Bar 
or a person allowed to appear 
before the court, or for failure to 
comply with these rules or order of 
the court. 
Utah R.App. P. 40(b). 
In addition, because Bryner "avails [himself] of the 
judicial machinery as a matter of routine, special leniency 
on the basis of pro se status is manifestly inappropriate." 
Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,, 4, 67 P.3d 1000. "This is 
particularly true where the filings in question are routinely 
frivolous and have been brought with the apparent 
purpose, or at least effect, of harassment, not only of 
opposing parties, but of the judicial machinery itself." Id. 
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at 1 5. "The courts of this state possess the powers 
necessary to maintain the orderly disposition of matters 
brought before them, including the power to levy 
sanctions and, in appropriate cases, to hold in contempt 
the parties who appear before them." Id at 'if 15. 
The petition filed in case no. 20060814-CA duplicates 
requests for relief contained in the previous appeals and in 
the first petition seeking extraordinary relief. In addition, 
the second petition contains statements that are patently 
offensive and disrespectful of the district court. We place 
Petitioner on notice that he will not be afforded leniency 
based upon his pro se status in the application of the 
procedural rules. Specifically, pleadings containing 
inappropriate content or dup Heating claims in prior or 
pending proceedings, or pleadings that appear calculated 
End of Document 
to harass any party, their counsel, or the court, will be 
stricken and will result in imposition of other sanctions, as 
allowed under rules 40 and 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Utah R.App. P. 33; 40. 
We deny both petitions seeking extraordinary relief in 
case nos. 20060754-CA and 20060814-CA. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 2779855, 2006 UT App 
398 
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Case No. 20080065-CA 
v. 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
and Judge William Barrett, 
Respondents. 
Before Judges Greenwood, McHugh, and Orme. 
Pursuant to rule 33(c) (2} of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner Roger Bryner was ordered to appear and show 
cause why damages should not be awarded to Respondents based upon 
Petitioner's filing of a frivolous petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. "[A] frivolous appeal, motion, brief or other paper is 
one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, 
or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b}. Damages may 
include single or double costs and/or reasonable attorney fees. 
See id. R. 33(c) (2). Under rule 33, a frivolous appeal or 
proceeding is one that has "no reasonable legal or factual 
basis." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
An appellate court considering imposition of sanctions is not 
required to find subjective bad faith before sanctions can be 
awarded under rule 33. See id. This court determined that the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus was frivolous because it was 
without a basis in law or fact. See Bryner v. Hon. Lindberg and 
Barrett, 2008 UT App 53. Furthermore, Bryner's argument at the 
order to show cause hearing that he thought his petition was well 
taken does not insulate him from paying damages. Consequently, 
this court could assess damages against Bryner pursuant to rule 
33. Despite this conclusion, this court exercises its discretion 
and chooses not to impose an award of damages under rule 33 in 
this instance. 
We caution Bryner, however, to take care with future 
filings, both in terms of the proper use of the motions and 
remedies afforded by the rules and in terms of the content of 
those documents. Bryner's memorandum, dated March 10, 2008, 
demonstrates the basis for our concern about inappropriate 
content in his filings. Indeed, we have previously admonished 
Bryner about such conduct. See Bryner v. Hon. Lindberg, 2006 UT 
App 398 (advising Bryner that inappropriate pleadings may be 
stricken or result in imposition of sanctions). That memorandum 
contains material that is "offensive, inappropriate, and 
disrespectful" and constitutes a violation of rule 24(k) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Peters v. Pine Meadow 
Ranch Home Assoc., 2007 UT 2, ~ 12, 151 P.3d 962 (striking briefs 
on appeal due to inappropriate content). The memorandum includes 
material that personally attacks the integrity of Utah courts and 
judges, rather than challenging claims of alleged legal or 
factual error. See id. at ii 7 & 15. We note the following 
instances of objectionable content: 
1. The statement on pages one and two to the effect 
that no Utah court will declare the Utah Standards of 
Professionalism and Civility unconstitutional "due to 
the fact that they ultimately report to the Utah 
Supreme Court, and thus are biased." 
2. The statement on page two that Utuh trial court 
judges "routinely use[] court proceedings which males 
have brought against females to punish the males 
without due process and without jurisdiction." 
3. The statement on page three attributed to an 
attorney, but not containing a direct quotation, that 
the trial judge's court "was so unconstitutional and 
biased as to be impossible to achieve any level of 
fairness in" and that "literally dozens of attorneys 
have expressed the same thoughts regarding [the trial 
judge] in regards to this case." 
4. The statement on page four that two district court 
judges have "conspired" to limit his ability to 
criticize those judges in connection with retention 
elections by entering orders that require him to comply 
with standards of civility and professionalism. 
2 
5. The statement on page four that "[w]hile [the] Pine 
Meadows [case] has established the precedent that 
disagreement and telling the truth about the courts can 
lead to violations of due process and punishing the 
'boy who said the emperor had no clothes' I disagree 
and am seeking to void the rules of professionalism and 
civility which led to these very bad decisions of law 
by taking my case to federal court .... " 
Bryner is hereby placed on notice that any future filings 
that are frivolous or contain (1) statements constituting 
personal attacks on the integrity of the Utah courts or judges; 
(2) burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous material; or 
(3) statements intended to harass the court, any party, or 
counsel participating in the case are prohibited, shall be 
stricken, and/or shall result in the imposition of sanctions 
under rules 33 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
A violation of this order shall be contempt, and shall be 
punished as this court deems appropriate. See Utah R. App. P. 
40 (c) ( "This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the 
court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.") 
Based on the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the order to show cause, dated 
February 22, 2008, is withdrawn and no damages are imposed at 
this time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bryner's future filings in this 
court shall not be frivolous and shall not include statements 
that (1) constitute personal attacks on the integrity of Utah 
courts or judges,~ Peters, 2007 UT 2 at~~ 7 & 15; (2) are 
"burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous", see Utah R. 
App. P. 24(k); or (3) are intended to harass the court, any 
party, or any counsel participating in the case, see Bryner v. 
Hon. Lindberg, 2006 UT App 398. The filing of any documents, 
motions, or pleadings of any kind containing such objectionable 
content shall be actionable as contempt, shall be stricken, and 
shall be sanctioned as this court deems appropriate. 
Dated this __ day of April, 2008. 
FOR THE COURT 
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*1 Roger Bryner appeals the trial court's contempt order 
and judgment entered on September 25, 2007. This matter 
is before the court on its own motion to strike Mr. 
Bryner's brief. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that an appellate court 
is not required to address the merits of an appeal if an 
appellant's brief contains unfounded accusations 
impugning the integrity of the court. See Peters v. Pine 
Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, ,I 1, 151 P.3d 
962. In these situations, the brief may be stricken and the 
appellate court may decline to consider the appeal as a 
sanction for violations of rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See id ~ 23. 
In this court's April 10, 2008 Order, Mr. Bryner was 
specifically ordered that his future filings must not 
contain frivolous content or include any statements that: 
( 1) constitute an attack on the integrity of Utah courts or 
judges, see id ~~ 1, 15; (2) are burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial, or scandalous, see Utah R.App. P. 24(k); or 
(3) are intended to harass the court, any party, or any 
counsel participating in the case. 1 Based on the violations 
of this court's Order and rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, we strike Mr. Bryner's brief and 
decline to reach the merits of his appeal. See Peters, 2007 
UT2, ~23. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order and judgment are 
affirmed. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 WL 2544897 
Mr. Bryner was previously admonished that his filings would be stricken if they contained inappropriate content. See 
Bryner v. Hon. Lindberg, 2006 UT App 398U, paras. 6-8 (mem.) (per curiam). 
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Decision 
PERCURIAM: 
*1 ,r 1 Roger Bryner appeals the dismissal of his civil case 
against the custodian of records for the Holladay Justice 
Court. We affirm. 
,r 2 Bryner was a defendant in a traffic case in the 
Holladay Justice Court. He filed a request under the 
Government Records Access and Management Act 
(GRAMA), seeking documents from his own case as well 
as sentencing documents in cases involving other persons 
who had been charged with the same offenses. He 
pursued appeals from the denial of his ORAMA request. 
Ultimately, the Management Committee of the Utah 
Judicial Council issued an order that granted Bryner's 
appeal in part and denied it in part. 
,I 3 In September 2014, Bryner filed the civil complaint in 
this case, claiming that the Holladay Justice Court did not 
comply with the Management Committee's order. On 
April 13, 2015, the district court held a motion hearing at 
which Bryner was allowed to appear by telephone. The 
district court stated that Bryner must appear in court in 
person for future proceedings. The district court set a trial 
date for June 8, 2015. The court reset the motion hearing 
for April 27, 2015, and also ordered the parties to be 
present on that date to engage in face-to-face discussions 
in an effort to resolve the case. Bryner requested that this 
discussion take place by telephone, which the court 
denied. Bryner did not appear on April 27, 2015, and the 
court denied his pending motion for summary judgment. 
,I 4 On April 30, 2015, Bryner filed a "motion to 
designate defendant" in which he sought to amend his 
complaint to name the court clerk of the Holladay Justice 
Court as a defendant. On May 5, 2015, Bryner filed a 
motion to issue a subpoena to the court clerk or "declare it 
unnecessary." In separate May 28, 2015 orders, the 
district court denied the motion to amend the complaint to 
add a new defendant and granted the motion to issue a 
subpoena directed to the court clerk, stating that Bryner 
was responsible for service of the subpoena. On the same 
day, the district court issued a subpoena. 
~ 5 On June 4, 2015, Bryner moved to reschedule the June 
8 trial, stating that he was Hunable to afford to serve 
process," and the district court "refused to waive fees for 
service of process." He also stated that he could not afford 
to travel to Salt Lake City for trial on his civil complaint 
and that he could not personally appear in the district 
court because he was subject to arrest on an outstanding 
warrant from the Holladay Justice Court. Bryner failed to 
appear for trial. Opposing counsel appeared, along with 
the court clerk of the Holladay Justice Court. The district 
court dismissed the case as a consequence of Bryner' s 
failure to appear. Noting opposing counsel's objection to 
a continuance, the district court stated, 
This court makes a record that the 
subpoena was issued regarding the 
witness he was concerned he would 
not be able to subpoena. That 
witness is present and Mr. Bryner 
would have been able to hear her 
testimony on this date. The Court 
makes a record of Mr. Bryner's 
concern for an outstanding warrant 
out of Holladay Justice Court. The 
Court rules that is not a basis for 
him not to appear in Court. The 
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Court denies Mr. Bryner's motion 
to continue this trial and moves 
forward. Based on Mr. Bryner's 
failure to appear and failure to put 
on evidence, with [the court clerk] 
present, the Court dismisses this 
case with prejudice. Additionally 
the court renders the pending 
motions [moot]. The Court denies 
Mr. Bryner'.s motion for a 
telephone conference. 
*2 ,r 6 "In reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for 
failure to prosecute, we accord the trial court broad 
discretion and do not disturb its decision absent an abuse 
of discretion and a likelihood that an injustice has 
occurred." Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 
697 (Utah Ct.App.1994). "In determining whether the 
court abused its discretion, we 'balance the need to 
expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial resources 
with the need to allow parties to have their day in court.' " 
Id. (citing Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ .• 
813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). In analyzing 
whether a trial court has abused its discretion in 
dismissing a case for failure to prosecute, we consider (1) 
the conduct of both parties, (2) the opportunity each party 
has to move the case forward, (3) what each party has 
done to move the case forward, (4) the amount of 
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the 
other side, and (5) whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. Cheek v. Clay Bulloch Constr., Inc., 2011 UT 
App 418, ,r 1,269 P.3d 964. In performing this review, we 
consider that "the plaintiff, as the party initiating the 
lawsuit, has the primary responsibility to move the case 
forward" and that the defendant has no general 
responsibility to move plaintiffs case forward. See 
Hartford leasing, 888 P.2d at 698 n. 2. 
,I 7 Because Bryner did not appear at the trial to present 
evidence in support of his claims that the Holladay Justice 
Court violated the Management Committee's order, those 
claims are not preserved for appeal. 1 The only issue 
before this court is whether the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his belated requests to continue the 
trial and hold a further telephone scheduling conference 
and in dismissing his civil case for failure to appear at 
trial. Bryner had ample notice of the trial date in his civil 
case. The court denied his motion to join the court clerk 
Footnotes 
as a defendant. The court granted Bryner's alternative 
motion to issue a subpoena to compel the clerk's 
appearance at trial, clarifying that Bryner was responsible 
for service. Four days before the scheduled trial, Bryner 
moved to continue the trial and hold a scheduling 
conference because he claimed he could not afford to 
serve the subpoena, could not afford transportation to 
court, and was subject to arrest on an outstanding warrant 
if he appeared in court. None of these circumstances 
excused Bryner from his primary responsibility to move 
his civil case forward. Contrary to his argument, rule 
4-502 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, 
which pertained to discovery disputes, did not require the 
district court to hold a further conference in this case. 
~ 8 Bryner argues that he was misled by the district court 
and the opposing party because he was not informed that 
the Holladay Justice Court clerk would be available at 
trial. At his request, the district court issued a subpoena to 
compel the attendance of a witness. Although he failed to 
serve the subpoena, the witness was present at trial. As 
the plaintiff in this civil case, Bryner had the primary 
responsibility to move the case forward. It was not the 
responsibility of the district court or the opposing party to 
prosecute Bryner's case or assure that it moved forward. 
Bryner was aware of the trial date. Bryner did not appear 
in person in court for any hearing in the civil case that he 
initiated, even when he was specifically required by the 
district court to do so. By failing to appear, he clearly 
risked the possibility that the case would be dismissed. 
Furthermore, the issuance of an arrest warrant was the 
result of Bryner's own conduct in another case and was 
not, as he now claims, a part of an alleged conspiracy 
involving court personnel to deny his access to the court. 
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying a continuance or the request for a scheduling 
conference and in dismissing the case. 
*3 ~ 9 We affirm the district court's dismissal of the 
underlying case with prejudice. 
All Citations 
--- P.3d ----, 2016 WL 869057, 2016 UT App 40 
Bryner attempts to raise a jurisdictional issue by alleging that the district court lacked authority to review the ~ 
Management Committee's order. Because Bryner filed the underlying case seeking to enforce the Management 
Committee's order, which necessarily involved review of its requirements, this assertion lacks merit. 
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